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1. Introduction and background 
Due to the perceived serious consequences of global warming and the scientific evidence on the 
link between the trend of global temperature and the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere, 
reducing CO2 emission has become an common effort of human beings in this planet. 
International shipping is the most energy efficient means of transportation in terms of units of 
emission per tome-mile cargo shipped. However, due to the enormous cargo volume, it still 
contributes a significant part of the global CO2 emission. According to International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), international shipping emitted 870 million tons of CO2 in year 2007, or 
about 2.7 percent of global CO2 emissions from fuel consumption. Considering the growth of 
maritime transport due to world economic development, CO2 emissions from this sector is 
expected to triple by 2050. From this perspective, emission reduction from shipping can also 
have significant contribution to the global CO2 reduction. Therefore, Marine Environment 
Protection Committee (MEPC) of IMO identified and developed policy options to reduce 
Green-House-Gas (GHG) emissions from ships. Many technical and operational measures have 
been formulated by MEPC, such as Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) and Ship Energy 
Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP), and Energy Efficiency Operational Indicator (EEOI). 
To motivate the shipping industries in adopting most efficient methods, IMO is also considering 
possible market-based measures (MBM) in international shipping, and one of the most 
promising alternatives in this category is the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) (Kageson, 2007; 
Miola et al, 2011) 
Even though, there are still many issues that need to be considered in design and 
implementation of the ETS. First, an ETS can be “open” or “closed”. In an open system, 
shipping companies can trade emission permits with other sectors, while in closed ETS they can 
only trade among themselves. The implication of applying different ETS on the realization of 
emission reduction objectives in the shipping industry has be to taken into account. Second, the 
shipping industry is not homogeneous.  Different types of cargo are carried in specialized ships 
with different costs, energy efficiency, have different market price and market structure. For 
example, compared with container ships, on average, dry-bulk ships are older, less expensive 
and less energy efficient. The cargo it carried has lower value, thus the ship speed is generally 
lower. In terms of market structure, container shipping market is believe to be more colluded 
because of its high concentration, and the existence of liner conferences and alliances. It is 
necessary to take into account the differences in different shipping sectors, and understand the 
different impacts of ETS implementation on the operation of individual sector, as well as the 
resulted changes in the production and consumption pattern, and the shift of international trade.  
Many existing studies in ETS in shipping focused on the advantages and flexibility of regional 
or sub-global scheme (Gilbert and Bows, 2012), allocation mechanism of emission permits 
(Haites, 2009; Kageson, 2007; Hepbrun et al, 2006). In general ETS, there are also studies that 
focusing on the impact of ETS on firm performance (Montomery, 1972; Bode, 2006; Demailly 
& Quirion , 2006), and many found that ETS may benefit companies (Sijm et al, 2006; Smale et 
al, 2006; Veith et al, 2009; Oberndorfer, 2009; Kim et al, 2009) as a result of the “Windfall 
Profit” in free allocation of excessive permits.   
In this paper, we analytically investigate and benchmark two different ETS mechanisms for 
international maritime transport sector, namely an open ETS scheme and a closed Maritime only 
scheme (METS). The analytical results can shed light on the effectiveness of ETS to achieve 
emission reduction objectives in international shipping sector. More importantly, our study 
quantifies the differential impacts of ETS on maritime sectors, such as container shipping and 
dry bulk shipping, and examined the differential impacts on shipping quantity, speed, fuel 
consumption, and their profits.  
Our modeling results suggest that ETS scheme, whether open or closed, will decrease ship’s 
cruising speed, throughput and fuel consumption for both container and bulk groups. The level 
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of reduction has negative relationship with permit prices. Under open ETS scheme, the emission 
reduction requirement is not binding, because shipping company can always buy permits if the 
allocated permits are not enough. In addition, we find that dry-bulk sectors will have higher 
proportional output reduction and sell more (or use less) permits. The profit of container 
shipping sector is less sensitive to the increase of permit price due to its low competitiveness. 
Under maritime only ETS, the emission reduction objective will definitely be reached. The 
permit price will have the same impact on the shipping quantity, speed and fuel consumption as 
in the open ETS case. The only difference is that market structure will have more significant 
impact than the open case. The collusiveness of one sector will only affect itself in open ETS, 
while it will affect the other less colluded sector in the closed ETS, as the other sector has to 
face the high permit price in the closed market. The economic model is calibrated with real 
shipping industry data. The empirical findings confirm the analytical results and also predict 
that container sector will buy the emission permits from dry-bulk side under maritime only ETS.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up basic model and solves the equilibrium for 
benchmark case without ETS scheme. In Section 3 we solve the equilibrium for an open ETS 
scheme case and compare the results with benchmark case. Section 4 considers a Closed 
Maritime Only ETS scheme consisting of container and bulk shipping sectors. Equilibrium of 
the emission trading behavior between the two sectors are derived and compared with other 
cases. Section 5 will illustrate the model’s calibration and discuss the empirical results.  Section 
6 provides concluding remarks.   
2. Economic model and benchmark case 
Among all the international maritime transport groups, dry bulk sector1 has the largest share in 
tonnage of cargo shipped, and container sector has the fastest growth rate (Figure 1). To 
simplify the analysis, we consider these two sectors only in this study2
 
. Since these two sectors 
use different ships, carry different goods and have different operation costs, the impacts of ETS 
on them are different.  In addition, our analysis is general, but can be applied to analyze route 
specific problem, since maritime ETS might be regional or multi-regional.  
 
 
Figure 1:  Share of three major cargo categories (measured in weight) and their growth indices (year 1980=100) 
Source: Review of Maritime Transport 2011, UNCTAD. 
                                                          
1 Dry bulk group includes the five major bulks (iron ore, coal, grain, bauxite/alumina and phosphate rock) and other dry bulk.  
2 Excluding Crude Oil group is because it has rather distinct operating characteristics compared to dry cargo shipments. As well, 
including Crude Oil group into our model will complicate our modeling analysis for closed ETS, making the mathematics not 
tractable.  
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We consider the case where there are 𝑁1 (𝑁2) carriers providing homogenous container (bulk) 
shipping services between Europe and Asia. Before ETS is introduced, the annual demands for 
container shipping and bulking shipping are independent (not substitutable), which can be 
modeled with the following demand functions  
 
𝑃1 = 𝑎1 − 𝑏1 ∑ 𝑞1,𝑖𝑁1𝑖=1          𝑖 = 1, …𝑁1 and 𝑁1 ≥ 1 (1.1) 
𝑃2 = 𝑎2 − 𝑏2 ∑ 𝑞2,𝑖𝑁2𝑖=1          𝑖 = 1, …𝑁2 and 𝑁2 ≥ 1 (1.2) 
 
where 𝑞𝑟,𝑖 is carrier i’s outputs / traffic volumes (𝑟 = 1 for container carrier; 𝑟 = 2 for bulk 
carrier), while 𝑃𝑟 is the market shipping price. 𝑡𝑟,𝑖 is the transport/shipping time for carrier i. If 
the average distance travelled by a ship is 𝐷𝑟 , the average cruising speed is 𝑆𝑟,𝑖 for carrier i, 
then we have  𝑡𝑟,𝑖 = 𝐷𝑟/𝑆𝑟,𝑖. 
Before ETS scheme is introduced, a carrier’s cost for one ship per year is the sum of fuel cost 
𝑓𝑟,𝑖 and capital cost of the ship 𝛾𝑟,𝑖.3
 
 Following Psaraftis (2008, 2009), fuel cost can be 
expressed as a cubic function of ship cruising speed as specified in equation (2), where 𝜆𝑟 is a 
coefficient representing a ship’s energy efficiency which depends on ship operation. And 𝜂 is 
fuel price. 
 𝑓𝑟,𝑖 = 𝜂𝜆𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖3  (2) 
 
The lower the value of 𝜆𝑟, the higher the energy efficiency, because it requires lower cost for 
given 𝑆𝑟,𝑖.  The annualized fixed cost of a ship, 𝛾𝑟  , is assumed to be fixed, which includes the 
capital and financial costs, periodical maintenance cost, and operation cost.  
Further we assume that the objective of the carrier is to maximize profit by choosing the optimal 
quantity and cruising speed. Then the problem of the carrier can be written as:  
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑞𝑟,𝑖,𝑆𝑟,𝑖  𝜋𝑟,𝑖 = 𝑃𝑟𝑞𝑟,𝑖 − (𝑓𝑟,𝑖 + 𝛾𝑟) 𝑞𝑟,𝑖𝑈𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖 𝜌/𝐷𝑟  (3) 
 
Where 𝑈𝑟  is the average capacity of a ship and  ρ is a ship’s average proportion of working 
days in a year. 𝑃𝑟𝑞𝑟,𝑖 is the yearly total revenue. 𝑓𝑟,𝑖+ 𝛾𝑟 is the total operating cost per ship in 
one year, equaling fuel cost plus the ship capital cost. 𝑞𝑟,𝑖
𝑈𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖 𝜌/𝐷𝑟 is the total number of ships 
utilized per year4
 
. The corresponding first order conditions (FOCs) for (3) are:  
 ∂𝜋𝑟,𝑖
∂𝑞𝑟,𝑖 = 𝑎𝑟 − 2𝑏𝑟𝑞𝑟,𝑖 − 𝑏𝑟 ∑ 𝑞𝑟,𝑗𝑁𝑟𝑗≠𝑖 − 𝑏𝑟𝑞𝑟,𝑖 ∑ 𝜕𝑞𝑟,𝑗𝜕𝑞𝑟,𝑖𝑁𝑟𝑗≠𝑖 − 1𝑈𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖 𝜌/𝐷𝑟 [𝜂𝜆𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖3 + 𝛾𝑟] = 0 (4.1) 
∂𝜋𝑟,𝑖
∂𝑆𝑟,𝑖 = −  𝑞𝑟,𝑖𝑈𝑟 𝜌/𝐷𝑟 �2 𝜂𝜆𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖 − 𝛾𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖2 � = 0 (4.2) 
                                                          
3 There may be other cost proportional to the number of ships per year, such as labor cost, insurance cost etc. Considering these 
costs explicitly will not change our model except that in such a case 𝛾 would be sum of such cost and capital costs of ships. 
4 In reality, ship number is incremental. When one ship is fully loaded, marginal additional cargo may require one more ship to be 
deployed. To make our analysis tractable, here, we assume that load factor of ship is 100% and the number of ship is continuous. 
The conclusion of the economic model will not alter when relaxing the above assumption. 
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Referring to Brander and Zhang (1990, 1993), Fu et al (2006), Basso and Zhang (2008), we 
introduce Conduct parameter  𝜈𝑟𝑖,𝑗 in FOC (4.1), and we assume 𝜈𝑟𝑖,𝑗 is a constant value5
 
. 
𝜈𝑟𝑖,𝑗 = ∑ 𝜕𝑞𝑟,𝑗𝜕𝑞𝑟,𝑖𝑁𝑟𝑗≠𝑖 ,    −1 ≤ 𝜈𝑟𝑖,𝑗 ≤ 𝑁𝑟 − 1    
This conduct parameter 𝜈𝑟𝑖,𝑗 measures how aggressively one firm competes with each other in 
the same market. When −1 ≤ 𝜈𝑟𝑖,𝑗 ≤ 0, the more negative the 𝜈𝑟𝑖,𝑗, the more fierce the 
competition is between two firms. While, when 0 ≤ 𝜈𝑟𝑖,𝑗 ≤ 𝑁𝑟 − 1, the more positive the 𝜈𝑟𝑖,𝑗, 
the more cooperative the two firms are. Specifically, 𝜈𝑟𝑖,𝑗 = 0 corresponds to Cournot 
competition; 𝜈𝑟𝑖,𝑗 = −1 corresponds to Bertrend competition; 𝜈𝑟𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑁𝑟 − 1 corresponds to 
Perfect collusion to maximize joint profit. (See Appendix 1 for detailed illustration). As well, 
the second order condition (SOC) for (3) is also checked and proves to satisfy (see Appendix 2).  
As we assume non-negative optimal traffic quantity, the FOC (4.2) can be transformed as (4.3): 
 2𝜂𝜆𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖3 − 𝛾𝑟 = 0 (4.3) 
 
Imposing symmetry so that 𝑞𝑟,1 = 𝑞𝑟,2 = ⋯ = 𝑞𝑟,𝑁𝑟 = 𝑞𝑟;𝑆𝑟,1 = 𝑆𝑟,2 = ⋯ = 𝑆𝑟,𝑁𝑟 = 𝑆𝑟; 
𝜈𝑟𝑖,𝑗 = 𝜈𝑟𝑖,𝑔 = 𝜈𝑟,𝑖,𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑔; and further 𝜈𝑟,1 = 𝜈𝑟,2 = ⋯𝜈𝑟,𝑁𝑟 = 𝜈𝑟, then the equilibrium 
speed and quantity for a carrier can be solved as: 
 
?̃?𝑟 = � 𝛾𝑟2𝜂𝜆𝑟3 > 0 (5.1) 
𝑞�𝑟 =  2𝑎𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌−3𝐷𝑟 �2𝜂𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟232𝑈𝑟𝜌𝑏𝑟[(𝑁𝑟+1)+𝜈𝑟]  (5.2) 
 
From (5.1), it is clear that the optimal speed is a function of the fixed cost and energy efficiency 
of the ship, as well as the fuel price. From this, one can see that ship speed is lower if a ship has 
lower fixed cost, lower efficiency (higher 𝜆𝑟), and higher fuel price.  
The fuel consumption volume at equilibrium can be obtained as 
 
 𝐹�𝑟 = 𝜆𝑟?̃?𝑟3 𝑞�𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌?̃?𝑟/𝐷𝑟 = �2𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟23 𝐷𝑟(2𝑎𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌−3𝐷𝑟 �2𝜂𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟23 )4 �𝜂23 𝑈𝑟2𝜌2𝑏𝑟[(𝑁𝑟+1)+𝜈𝑟]  (5.3) 
 
The non-negativity of shipping quantity 𝑞�𝑟 and fuel consumption  𝐹�𝑟 implies that  
 2𝑎𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌 > 3𝐷𝑟�2𝜂𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟23   (6) 
In addition, it is direct to show following comparative statics results (see Appendix 3) 
 
                                                          
5Using Conduct Parameter Method (CPM) or “Conjecture Variation” to measure market competition intensity is widely adopted in 
economic studies, such as Bresnahan (1981), Roberts (1984), Graddy (1995) and a review paper by Corts (1999). Brander and 
Zhang (1990, 1993),  Fu et al (2006), Basso and Zhang (2008)  applied CPM in air transport industry.  
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 ∂𝑞�𝑟
∂𝜂
< 0, ∂𝑞�𝑟
∂𝜆𝑟
< 0, ∂𝑞�𝑟
∂𝐷𝑟
< 0, ∂𝑞�𝑟
∂𝜈𝑟
< 0, ∂𝑞�𝑟
∂𝑈𝑟
> 0, ∂𝑞�𝑟
∂𝛾𝑟
< 0; ∂?̃?𝑟
∂𝜂
< 0,  ∂?̃?𝑟
∂𝜆𝑟
< 0, ∂?̃?𝑟
∂𝛾𝑟
> 0 ; ∂𝐹�𝑟
∂𝜂
< 0, 
∂𝐹�𝑟
∂𝜈𝑟
< 0, the signs for ∂𝐹�𝑟
∂𝜆𝑟
, ∂𝐹
�𝑟
∂𝑈𝑟
 are unclear. (7) 
 
The interpretations of above comparative statics are straightforward: when fuel price increases 
or the fuel efficiency is lower, carriers will slow their cruising speed to save fuel cost, thus 
resulting lower total fuel consumption and traffic quantity. When ship capital cost increases, 
carriers increase cruising speed to reduce the number of ships used and save on ship capital 
costs. Despite higher speed, total traffic volume decreases as a result of increasing ship capital 
cost, indicating shipping carriers reduce the number of ships in larger degree. Besides, when 
market is more collusive, carriers will reduce capacity deployed in the market so as to raise the 
price, thus achieving higher profit. It is noted that the optimal cruising speed is affected neither 
by market competition type, average shipping distance nor the average ship size. This is because 
that cruising speed is not a strategic variable for carrier to compete with each other. Carriers set 
optimal cruising speed in order to minimize operating cost given throughput, average route 
distance and ship size (as shown in FOC (4.2)). 
3. An open ETS scheme 
In this case, maritime carriers need to buy/sell emission permit with other industries. This 
implies that the market price of emission permit is (mostly) exogenous. In such a case, ETS is 
equivalent to a uniform charge on emission, which can be a positive tax/charge (if carriers buy 
emission permit) or negative subsidy (if carriers sell emission permit). Since there is a definite 
relationship between fuel consumption and gas emission, ETS is equivalent to a tax/subsidy on 
fuel consumption. Assuming that each carrier is pre-allocated a quota of free emission which is 
𝜃 (0 < 𝜃 < 100%) percentage of her existing fuel consumption, a shipping firm’s profit 
maximization problem is defined as follows for the case of a container carrier 𝑟 = 1 or a bulk 
carrier 𝑟 = 2, where 𝜒 > 0  is the exogenously determined ETS charge per ton of fuel. 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑞𝑟,𝑖,𝑆𝑟,𝑖  𝜋𝑟,𝑖 = 𝑃𝑟𝑞𝑟,𝑖 − (𝑓𝑟,𝑖 + 𝛾𝑟) 𝑞𝑟,𝑖𝑈𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖 𝜌/𝐷𝑟 − 𝜒[𝜆𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖3 𝑞𝑟,𝑖𝑈𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖 𝜌/𝐷𝑟 − 𝜃𝐹�𝑟]   (8) 
 
Since container and bulk shipping sector trade with the open ETS separately, the solutions for 
these two sectors are independent. The outcomes of trade are determined exogenously by 
emission permit price 𝜒  and the target of emission reduction percentage (1 − 𝜃).  
The corresponding FOCs for maximization problem (8) are: 
 
∂𝜋𝑟,𝑖
∂𝑞𝑟,𝑖 = 𝑎𝑟 − 2𝑏𝑟𝑞𝑟,𝑖 − 𝑏𝑟 ∑ 𝑞𝑟,𝑗𝑁𝑟𝑗≠𝑖 − 𝑏𝑟𝑞𝑟,𝑖 ∑ 𝜕𝑞𝑟,𝑗𝜕𝑞𝑟,𝑖𝑁𝑟𝑗≠𝑖 − 1𝑈𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖 𝜌/𝐷𝑟 [(𝜂 + 𝜒)𝜆𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖3 + 𝛾𝑟] = 0 (9.1) 
 
∂𝜋𝑟,𝑖
∂𝑆𝑟,𝑖 = − 𝑞𝑟,𝑖𝑈𝑟 𝜌/𝐷𝑟 �2 (𝜂 + 𝜒)𝜆𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖 − 𝛾𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖2 � = 0 (9.2) 
 
Imposing symmetry so that 𝑞𝑟,1 = 𝑞𝑟,2 = ⋯ = 𝑞𝑟,𝑁𝑟 = 𝑞𝑟 , and 𝑆𝑟,1 = 𝑆𝑟,2 = ⋯ = 𝑆𝑟,𝑁𝑟 =
𝑆𝑟; 𝜈𝑟𝑖,𝑗 = 𝜈𝑟𝑖,𝑔 = 𝜈𝑟,𝑖, = 𝑣𝑟 (𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑔); the equilibrium quantity and cruising speed for 
container shipping group can be solved: 
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𝑞�𝑟 = 2𝑎𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌−3𝐷𝑟 �2(𝜂+𝜒)𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟232𝑈𝑟𝜌𝑏𝑟[(𝑁𝑟+1)+𝜈𝑟]  (10.1) 
𝑆?̅? = � 𝛾𝑟2(𝜂+𝜒)𝜆𝑟3 > 0 (10.2) 
 
and fuel consumption:  
 
𝐹�𝑟 = �2𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟23 𝐷𝑟(2𝑎𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌−3𝐷𝑟 �2(𝜂+𝜒)𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟23 )4 �(𝜂+𝜒)23 𝑈𝑟2𝜌2𝑏𝑟[(𝑁𝑟+1)+𝜈𝑟]   (10.3) 
The non-negativity of  𝑞�𝑟 and 𝐹�𝑟 implies that 
 2𝑎𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌 > 3𝐷𝑟�2(𝜂 + 𝜒)𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟23   (11) 
 
Comparing solutions in (10) and (5), under the open ETS, it is observed that the equilibrium 
solutions in (10) are equivalent to adding the emission permit price 𝜒 to fuel price 𝜂. From (7), 
we know ∂𝑞�𝑟
∂𝜂
< 0, ∂?̃?𝑟
∂𝜂
< 0 and ∂𝐹�𝑟
∂𝜂
< 0. Therefore, it is clear that under the open ETS scheme, 
for any θ<1, the fuel consumption, traffic quantity and cruising speed for the shipping industry 
will reduce if there is any positive price for the emission permit.  And the degree of reduction 
simply depends on the exogenous determined emission permit price χ. Specifically, the larger χ 
is, the more the fuel consumption, traffic quantity and cruising speed decrease. 
Although the target emission reduction percentage(1 − 𝜃) does not affect the equilibrium fuel 
consumption volume, traffic quantity and cruising speed (as 𝜃 does not enter the FOCs for 
optimization problem (8)), 𝜃 determines the trading behavior of the shipping industry with other 
sectors under the open ETS scheme. We define 𝜃𝑟′ as the ratio of fuel usage in the open ETS 
scheme with that in no ETS, i.e.,  
 
𝜃𝑟
′ = 𝐹�𝑟
𝐹�𝑟
= �( 𝜂𝜂+𝜒)23 (2𝑎𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌−3𝐷𝑟 �2(𝜂+𝜒)𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟23 )(2𝑎𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌−3𝐷𝑟 �2𝜂𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟23 ) < 1 (12) 
 
Since 𝜃𝑟′ is a decreasing function of  𝜒. When the price of emission permit (𝜒) increases, carriers 
have more incentive to reduce fuel usage and sell emission permits. Also, it is interesting to note 
that 𝜃𝑟′ is irrelevant to market competition condition determined by number of shipping firms or 
their conduct parameters. This indicates that the market structure will not alter the emission 
abatement behavior of the two sectors.  
Due to the fact that most of the containerships are newer than dry-bulk ships, it is generally 
believed that containers are more expansive and fuel efficient than dry-bulk ships. Then it is 
possible to analysis the different impacts of open ETC on the two shipping sectors. To examine 
the proportional throughput and output reduction due to ETS, we define the proportional 
reduction in throughput and speed as (13.1) and (13.2) respectively: 
 
𝑅𝑟 = 𝑞�𝑟−𝑞�𝑟𝑞�𝑟   (13.1) 
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Take partial derivatives of 𝑞𝑟 and 𝜃𝑟
′ w.r.t. 𝛾𝑟 and 𝜆𝑟, we can obtain: 
 
𝜕𝑅𝑟
𝜕𝛾𝑟
< 0 and 𝜕𝑅𝑟
𝜕𝜆𝑟
> 0, means that, ceteris paribus, containerships have less proportional 
reduction in shipping output.  
𝜕𝜃𝑟
′
𝜕𝛾𝑟
> 0 and 𝜕𝜃𝑟′
𝜕𝜆𝑟
< 0, mean that, ceteris paribus, container ships will use more fuel (sell less).  
 
Of course, this theoretical analysis using comparative statics method does not take into account 
the difference in actual market demand, shipping distance, average ship size, etc, between two 
sectors. Nevertheless, the result is consistent with general expectation about the two sectors.  
𝑇𝑟 = 𝑞�𝑟−𝑞�𝑟𝑞�𝑟  (13.2) 
 
Substituting (5.2) and (10.1) into (13.2) we get  𝑇𝑟 = 1 − � 𝜂(𝜂+𝜒)3 . It is interesting to observe 
that 𝑇𝑟  is only dependent on fuel price 𝜂 and permit price 𝜒, implying that container ship and 
dry-bulk ship will have same proportional speed reduction.  
The implementation of the common ETS scheme can affect the profit for the shipping industry 
when compared with the benchmark case (no ETS scheme).  Substitute the 𝑞�𝑟, 𝑆?̅?,𝐹�𝑟back into 
the profit function, and totally differentiate that with respect to the permit price 𝜒, we get: 
 
𝑑𝜋�𝑟,𝑖
𝑑𝜒
= 𝜕𝜋�𝑟,𝑖
𝜕𝑞𝑟,𝑖 𝜕𝑞𝑟,𝑖𝜕𝜒�����
=0
+ 𝜕𝜋�𝑟,𝑖
𝜕𝑞𝑟,𝑗 𝜕𝑞𝑟,𝑗𝜕𝜒�����
≥0
+ 𝜕𝜋�𝑟,𝑖
𝜕𝑆𝑟,𝑖 𝜕𝑆𝑟,𝑖𝜕𝜒�����
=0
+ 𝜕𝜋�𝑟,𝑖
𝜕𝜒�
≥ 𝑜𝑟<0 (14) 
 = (𝜈𝑟 − 𝑁𝑟 + 1)𝑏𝑟𝑞�𝑟 𝜕𝑞�𝑟𝜕𝜒 − [𝜆𝑟𝑆?̅?3 𝑞�𝑟𝑈𝑟?̅?𝑟𝜌/𝐷𝑟 − 𝜃𝐹�𝑟]  
 
Since  𝜈𝑟 ≤ 𝑁𝑟 − 1 and 𝜕𝑞�𝑟𝜕𝜒 < 0 , the first expression (𝜈𝑟 − 𝑁𝑟 + 1)𝑏𝑟𝑞�𝑟 𝜕𝑞�𝑟𝜕𝜒  is non-negative. 
This can be regarded as “Freight market” effect, because the increase in 𝜒 reduces 𝑞�𝑟,𝑗(𝜒) of a 
carrier, which will result in larger increasing freight rate due to this aggregated effects. The 
second term, −[𝜆𝑟𝑆?̅?3 𝑞�𝑟𝑈𝑟?̅?𝑟 𝜌/𝐷𝑟 − 𝜃𝐹�𝑟], can be regarded as “Emission Market” effect, which is 
negative when a shipping company buys permits and positive when a shipping company sells 
emission permits. If the market is more elastic, or the price of the emission permit is small, the 
sign for  𝑑𝜋�𝑟,𝑖
𝑑𝜒
 will be positive.  
From (14), it is also clear that the change of the profit with respect to emission permit price is 
only depends on parameters 𝜃, 𝜈𝑟 and 𝑁𝑟.Therefore, it can be concluded that: 
For Perfect collusion case ( 𝜈𝑟 = 𝑁𝑟 − 1 ), shipping firms’ profits will decrease with χ and be 
lower than benchmark case for any given θ.  For Bertrand competition case ( 𝜈𝑟 = −1 ), 
shipping firms’ profits will always be higher than the benchmark case. For Cournot competition 
case ( 𝜈𝑟 = 0 ), when 𝜃 < 2𝑁𝑟+1, the profit change pattern is the same as the Perfect collusion 
case, while for 𝜃 ≥ 2
𝑁𝑟+1
, the profit change pattern is the same as the Bertrand competition case.  
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4. A maritime only ETS scheme (METS) 
In the case of METS, the main difference is that the price of emission permit is no longer 
exogenously determined. Instead, it is the result of emission trade between the container and 
bulk sectors. In addition, the allowable emission (θ<1) is proportional to her existing fuel 
consumption and given for free.  Since the problem is to compare the different impacts on the 
two sectors with or without emission trade under the same emission reduction objective, the 
analysis can start with the emission reduction without the trade.  
Since the allocation of free permits is proportional, the optimal solution is to use all the free 
permits when there is no trade. Therefore, the problem for each sector is a maximization 
problem with binding constraint:  
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑞𝑟,𝑖,𝑆𝑟,𝑖   𝜋𝑟,𝑖 = 𝑃𝑟𝑞𝑟,𝑖 − (𝑓𝑟,𝑖 + 𝛾𝑟) 𝑞𝑟,𝑖𝑈𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖 𝜌/𝐷𝑟 (15) 
 
𝑠. 𝑡.       𝜆𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖3 𝑞𝑟,𝑖𝑈𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖 𝜌/𝐷𝑟 = 𝜃𝐹�𝑟  
By introducing the Lagrangian multiplier 𝜙𝑟,𝑖 > 0, we can specify the corresponding 
Lagrangian function as follows. 
 
𝐿𝜙𝑟,𝑖 = 𝑃𝑟𝑞𝑟,𝑖 − (𝑓𝑟,𝑖 + 𝛾𝑟) 𝑞𝑟,𝑖𝑈𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖 𝜌/𝐷𝑟 − 𝜙𝑟,𝑖[ 𝜆𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖3 𝑞𝑟,𝑖𝑈𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖 𝜌/𝐷𝑟 − 𝜃𝐹�𝑟]  (16) 
The corresponding FOCs for the Lagrangian function (16) in 𝑞𝑟,𝑖, 𝑆𝑟,𝑖, and 𝜙𝑟,𝑖 can be derived 
as follows: 
 
 
∂𝐿𝜙𝑟,𝑖
∂𝑞𝑟,𝑖 = 𝑎𝑟 − 2𝑏𝑟𝑞𝑟,𝑖 − 𝑏𝑟 ∑ 𝑞𝑟,𝑗𝑁𝑟𝑗≠𝑖 − 𝑏𝑟𝑞𝑟,𝑖 ∑ 𝜕𝑞𝑟,𝑗𝜕𝑞𝑟,𝑖𝑁𝑟𝑗≠𝑖 − 1𝑈𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖 𝜌/𝐷𝑟 [(𝜂 + 𝜙𝑟,𝑖)𝜆𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖3 + 𝛾𝑟] = 0   
(17.1) 
 
∂𝐿𝜙𝑟,𝑖
∂𝑆𝑟,𝑖 = − 𝑞𝑟,𝑖𝑈𝑟 𝜌/𝐷𝑟 �2 (𝜂 + 𝜙𝑟,𝑖)𝜆𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖 − 𝛾𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖2 � = 0 (17.2) 
 
(17.3)                      ∂𝐿𝜙𝑟,𝑖
∂𝜙𝑟,𝑖 =  𝜆𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖3 𝑞𝑟,𝑖𝑈𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖𝜌/𝐷𝑟 − 𝜃𝐹�𝑟 = 0 (17.3) 
 
Imposing symmetry, and solving (17.1) and (17.2) for optimal quantity and speed as a function 
of  𝜙𝑟, and substituting them into (17.3), we have following important equation:  
 
𝜃𝐹�𝑟 = �2𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟23 𝐷𝑟(2𝑎𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌−3𝐷𝑟 �2(𝜂+𝜙𝑟)𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟23 )4 �(𝜂+𝜙𝑟)23 𝑈𝑟2𝜌2𝑏𝑟[(𝑁𝑟+1)+𝜈𝑟]    (18) 
 
The parameter  𝜙𝑟 is the shadow price of emission permit constrain. It indicates the contribution 
to the profit of the shipping company by relaxing the emission constraint by one unit, i.e.  𝑑𝜋�𝑟
𝑑(𝜃𝐹�𝑟) = 𝜙�𝑟 .  
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From economic reasoning, it is straightforward that when 𝜙�1 and 𝜙�2 are different, both 
container and bulk sectors have incentive to trade. The shipping group with higher 𝜙�𝑟 will buy 
emission permits as long as the price is lower than 𝜙�𝑟.  Any trading price ℎ between 𝜙�1and 𝜙�2 
will lead to a Pareto improvement in two sectors compared with no trading. 
From this, we can see that the direction of emission transfer between two sectors. At the 
equilibrium (no sector has incentive to trade), the shadow price of the two sectors are equal, i.e.:  
 
  𝜃𝐹�1 +△�= �2𝜆1𝛾123 𝐷1(2𝑎1𝑈1𝜌−3𝐷1 �2(𝜂+ℎ�)𝜆1𝛾123 )4 �(𝜂+ℎ)23 𝑈12𝜌2𝑏1[(𝑁1+1)+𝜈1]   (19.1) 
 
   𝜃𝐹�2 −
𝑁1△�
𝑁2
= �2𝜆2𝛾223 𝐷2(2𝑎2𝑈2𝜌−3𝐷2 �2(𝜂+ℎ�)𝜆2𝛾223 )
4 �(𝜂+ℎ)23 𝑈22𝜌2𝑏2[(𝑁2+1)+𝜈2]        (19.2) 
 
When container and bulk groups trade at price ℎ�, the traffic quantity, cruising speed and fuel 
consumption at the equilibrium are: 
 
 𝑞�𝑟 = 2𝑎𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌−3𝐷𝑟 �2(𝜂+ℎ�)𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟232𝑈𝑟𝜌𝑏𝑟[(𝑁1+1)+𝜈𝑟] , ?̂?𝑟 = � 𝛾𝑟2(𝜂+ℎ�)𝜆𝑟3 ,𝐹�𝑟 = �2𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟23 𝐷𝑟(2𝑎𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌−3𝐷𝑟 �2(𝜂+ℎ�)𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟23 )4 �(𝜂+ℎ�)23 𝑈𝑟2𝜌2𝑏𝑟[(𝑁1+1)+𝜈𝑟])    (20) 
 
Equations (20) are very similar to equilibrium results in the open ETS case (equation 10), except 
that the exogenous permit price in (10) are replaced by the equilibrium permit price. From this, 
we can see that the impact of the equilibrium price will have the same impact on the 
performance of the two sectors.  
Since the emission permit is a valuable resource, from economic intuition, the shadow price for 
both sectors will increase with lower free emission permit quota, which will lead to higher price 
for emission permit. This can be illustrated by Figure 2, where the black curves stand for the 
shadow price with emission permit θ2, and the red curves are those with lower emission permit 
θ1<θ2.  It is clear that the market price for emission permit will be higher with lower emission 
permit.  
 
Figure 2:  Change of 𝒉� with 𝜽 (𝜽𝟏 < 𝜽𝟐) 
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To understand how the market structure affects the emission trading price, using (5.3), (19.1) 
can be rearranged into 
 
 �2𝜆1𝛾1
23 𝐷1
4𝑈1
2𝜌2𝑏1[(𝑁1+1)+𝜈1] ��2𝑎1𝑈1𝜌−3𝐷1 �2(𝜂+𝜙1)𝜆1𝛾123 ��(𝜂+𝜙1)23 − 𝜃 2𝑎1𝑈1𝜌−3𝐷1 �2𝜂𝜆1𝛾123�𝜂23 � =△1.  
 
Thus, ∀ △1> 0, it is apparent that 𝜙1 increases when 𝜈1decreases (see Figure (5)), thus the resultant ℎ� is 
higher. Similarly, by rearranging (19.2), it can be proved that 𝜙2 and resultant ℎ� increases when 𝜈2 
increases.  
 
Figure 3:  Change of 𝒉� with 𝝂𝟏 (𝝂𝟏′′ < 𝝂𝟏′ ) 
It is easy to understand that when market is more competitive for the shipping sector buying 
emission permit, the emission permit price will be pushed up because carriers are more 
aggressive to acquire the permits so as to compete more effectively in the market. While for the 
shipping sector selling the emission permit, increasing market collusion may help carriers to 
have larger bargaining power in order to negotiate a higher permit price with the other shipping 
sector.   
Finally, comparing the results of the open ETS and METS, it is clear that the impact on the 
shipping industry are the same only if the emission trading price in these two schemes are equal. 
The only difference is that the χ is exogenous, while h is determined by the shipping sectors 
mutual trading and by the target emission reduction objective 1-θ.   
5. Model calibration and empirical results 
To simulate the economic impacts of ETS on the shipping industry, the above economic model 
needs to be calibrated. Real market data for international shipping in year 2007 is adopted for 
this numerical simulation. Ship’s average cruising speed and size are calculated using data from 
Buhaug et al. (2009) (see Appendix 4).  Container ship has an average speed ?̃?1 = 25 knots / 
hr6
Aggregate shipping throughput data is available from Review of Maritime Transport 2008 
published by UNCTAD. In year 2007, container sector carried 𝑄�1 = 1,264,000,000 tons of 
, while dry-bulk ship’s speed is ?̃?2 = 14 knots / hr. The average ship size is 𝑈1 = 23,000 
tons for container ship, and 𝑈2 = 49,000 tons for dry bulk ship. In addition, we assume that a 
ship works 270 days per year (𝜌 = 0.74). 
                                                          
6 Units for different parameters has been unified to do the numerical simulation. For example, the speed is converted into 
knots/year for the simulation. That is ?̃?1 = 279,000 knots / year; ?̃?2 = 122,640 knots / year.  
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cargo, and dry-bulk sector carried 𝑄�2 = 4,023,000,000 tons. From the Review of Maritime 
Transport 2008, the average freight rate for container sector is calculated to be 𝑃�1 = 240 USD / 
ton for an average voyage distance 𝐷1 = 9,093 nautical miles (see Appendix 5). Ship bunker 
fuel price is assumed to be 𝜂 = 250 USD/ton. Capital cost per ship 𝛾𝑟 is a catch-all cost item for 
all cost items except the fuel. It is assumed that 𝛾1 = 100,000 USD / day for container ship7.  
Because data for dry-bulk sector is rather incomplete, it is thus assumed that dry-bulk ship has 
the same route distance as container ship (𝐷2 = 9,093 nautical mils), but dry-bulk freight rate is 
only 1/5 of container freight rate (𝑃�2 = 48 USD / ton), and the capital cost for dry-bulk carrier 
is only 2/5 of the container ship’s capital cost (𝛾2 = 40,000 USD / day)8
For model tractability, we assumed that there are 𝑁𝑟 symmetric shipping firms. For container 
sector, worldwide capacity share of the top 15 container shipping operators correspond to a 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of 995, equivalent to 𝑁1 = 10 symmetric firms competing 
in the market 
.  
9
First, based on function (5.1), ship’s energy efficiency parameter  𝜆𝑟 can be directly estimated 
as   𝜆1 = 6.95 × 10−12 and 𝜆2 = 1.58 × 10−11. This result states that, given the same cruising 
speed, one container ship consumes less fuel than that of dry-bulk ship. However, as container 
and dry-bulk ships have different size, we need to adjust  𝜆𝑟 on the ship size so as to compare 
ship’s fuel efficiency. Dividing  𝜆𝑟 by ship size, it is obtained that  𝜆1𝑈1 = 3.0 × 10−16 < 𝜆2𝑈2 =3.2 × 10−16 . This implies that container ship is more fuel efficient than dry-bulk ship, which is 
in line with our expectation.  
. For the dry-bulk market, it is assumed that there are 𝑁2 = 20 symmetric dry-
bulk carriers in the market. Regarding market conduct parameter 𝜈𝑟, we assume 𝜈1 = 0.8 and 
𝜈2 = 0. This assumption reflects the fact that container shipping market is much more colluded, 
while dry-bulk market is more competitive. However, as our assumption on conduct parameter 
is rather subjective, a sensitivity test is thus conducted with different pairs of (𝜈1, 𝜈2) in Section 
5.3. The test result shows that changing values of conduct parameters confirms with the 
conclusions drawn from the calibration. 
Finally, with the estimated 𝜆𝑟 and the following two equations (21) and (22), the unknown 
parameters in the demand function, the fuel consumption and profit with not ETS be estimated 
as summarized in Table 1. 
 
𝑃�𝑟 = 𝑎𝑟 − 𝑏𝑟𝑄�𝑟 (21) 
 
𝑄�𝑟
𝑁𝑟
= 𝑞�𝑟 = 2𝑎𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌−3𝐷𝑟 �2𝜂𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟232𝑈𝑟𝜌𝑏𝑟[(𝑁𝑟+1)+𝜈𝑟]   (22) 
 
  
                                                          
7We assume 𝛾1 = 100,000 USD / day so that the estimated total revenue and total cost for container operator have the same 
digits. Assuming smaller 𝛾1 makes the revenue too large when compared to cost.  
8 These assumptions on dry-bulk sector should be reasonable because it is well recognized that dry-bulk sector has much lower 
freight rate and capital cost than container sector. Meanwhile, we will see later that the assumed  P�2 and γ2 create reasonable 
parameters estimation for the dry-bulk sector. 
9 The 16th world largest container liner, Hamburg Sud, only has 1.55% in world container capacity in year 2007. This market share 
is very small with little contribution to HHI index. Thus we only consider the top 15 container liners in our study. The capacity 
shares of world top 20 container liners are available in Review of Maritime Transport 2008. 
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Table1:  Derived benchmark case model parameter values10
Parameter  
 
𝑎1 𝑎2 𝑏1 𝑏2 
Value 835.69 117.67     4.71 × 10−7      1.73 × 10−8 
Parameter  𝐹�1 𝐹�2 𝜋�1 𝜋�2 
Value  2.24 × 107  1.19 × 107 1.36 × 1010 7.01 × 108 
 
5.1 Model calibration for open ETS 
The analytical model suggests that under open ETS, both container and dry-bulk sectors will 
have reduction in speed and throughput, and dry-bulk sector will have larger proportion of 
throughput reduction. This is can be seen from simulation result in Figure 4. It shows that 
container and dry-bulk sectors have the same proportion in speed reduction (Figure 4(a)). This 
observation is consistent with our prediction drawn from the analytical model (13.1) because 
this proportion is only dependent on fuel price and emission permit price. But as container ship 
has higher cruising speed, it will face larger speed reduction in magnitude. For throughput 
change, the dry-bulk sector has larger reduction in proportion. This can be explained when 
referring to (13.2): First, dry-bulk ship is less fuel efficient, making it more sensitive to fuel 
price increase 11
 
 because it consumes more fuel ceteris paribus. Second, our calibration result 
shows that dry-bulk market is much more price elastic (𝑏2 < 𝑏1 and 𝑎2 < 𝑎1) than container 
ship market, thus price increase due to ETS permit charge has a more severe negative impact on 
dry-bulk throughput .   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                    
 
 
 
 (a) (b) 
Figure 4:  Proportional reduction in cruising speed and output with 𝝌 
 
  
                                                          
10 Parameter 𝑎 has unit as USD per ton. Parameter 𝑏 has unit as USD per ton squared. 
11 the permit charge can be regarded as tax on fuel 
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From the analytical model, we also know that the emission reduction target (1 − 𝜃) is not 
binding for open ETS because carriers can trade permits with outside sectors. But the parameter 
𝜃 is important to decide carriers’ permit trading behavior and also their profit. Figure 5 depicts 
the critical proportion 𝜃𝑟′ derived from equation (12), while Figure 6 shows the change of 
carrier’s profit with permit price 𝜒 for different values of 𝜃. From Figure 5, it is clear that 
container sector always has higher 𝜃𝑟′ than dry-bulk sector, indicating that container carrier is 
more likely to buy emission permits than dry-bulk sector under open ETS. In addition, from 
Figure 6, it is clear that when carriers receive small amount of free permit allocation (𝜃 =0, 0.1 and 0.2), their profits are more likely to decline under ETS. This is because carriers have 
to buy more permits from the open ETS market when receiving not enough free emission quota. 
This makes the negative “Emission Market” effect to dominant positive price rising “Freight 
Market” effect. However, when 𝜃 is large enough, the positive price rising “Freight Market” 
effect will then prevail, making carriers to earn “Windfall Profit” under the open ETS. It is also 
noted that the profit for dry-bulk sector is much more impacted than the container sector under 
open ETS (Figure7).     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  Critical proportion 𝜽𝒓′  with 𝝌 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
 
 
 
 (a) (b) 
Figure 6:  Profit change with 𝝌 for different values of 𝜽 
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Figure 7:  Proportional change in Profit with 𝝌 under open ETS (𝜽 = 𝟎.𝟓) 
5.2 Model calibration for METS 
Compared to open ETS, METS has the same impacts on international shipping sectors if 
emission permit prices are equal. However, under METS, the permit price is endogenously 
decided by the mutual permit trading between container and dry-bulk sectors. With the 
estimated parameters, the shadow prices 𝜙�𝑟, and the resultant market clearance permit price ℎ� 
can be simulated using equations (19). The simulation result is collated in Table 2.  It should be 
noted that as the emission reduction target (1 − 𝜃) will always be binding under METS, 
regulator is thus unlikely to set a very rigorous emission reduction goal because small 𝜃 will 
result in too much reduction in international shipping throughput12
The simulation result essentially shows that the container sector always has higher fuel shadow 
price than that of dry-bulk sector (𝜙�1 > 𝜙�2). This indicates that under METS, container carrier 
will purchase emission permits from the dry-bulk sector. This result should be intuitive since the 
fuel is regarded as more valuable production materials for container sector because it has much 
higher freight rate and more fuel efficient vessels.  
. Therefore, we consider the 
range of 𝜃 to be (0.6,0.95) for our simulation.  
From numerical simulation, the impacts of emission free allocation amount and the market 
competition structure on METS equilibrium can be directly observed. The result is in line with 
the analytical model analysis demonstrated in Figure 2 and 3. Figure 8 and 9 are the numerical 
simulation for Figure 2 and 3 respectively. Figure 8 clearly shows that the permit clearance 
price ℎ� increases when fewer emission quota is allocated. And in Figure 9, we see that the ℎ� 
increases when the emission permit buyer (container sector) is more competitive (with lower 
𝜈1); and when the emission seller (dry-bulk sector) is more collusive (with higher 𝜈2).  
In addition, it is noted that the values of 𝜙�𝑟, △� and ℎ� are significantly sensitive to the change in 
𝜃. Small reduction of the permit allocation will result in significant change in market 
equilibrium of permit trading between container and dry-bulk sectors. Thus if METS is chosen 
by regulator, the value of  𝜃 should be carefully designed so as not to impose too dramatic 
impact on international shipping industry. 
 
                                                          
12 When θ = 0.2, the output will reduce by 56% for dry-bulk sector and 20% for container sector. This dramatic output reduction 
may impose serious impact on international trade and economy.  
𝜃 = 0.1 𝜃 = 0.2 𝜃 0.5 𝜃 = 0.8 
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Table 2:  Equilibrium of METS for different values of 𝜽 
𝜃 ℎ� △� 𝜙�1 𝜙�2 
0.95 16.5 99,868 18.2 15.1 
0.90 34.9 197,859 38.7 31.9 
0.85 55.7 293,818 62.1 50.7 
0.80 79.2 387,569 88.9 71.8 
0.75 106.0 478,910 119.8 95.6 
0.70 136.8 567,604 155.8 122.6 
0.65 172.6 653,374 198.3 153.7 
0.60 214.6 735,890 248.9 189.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8:  Simulated change in METS equilibrium with different 𝜽 
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Figure 9:  Simulated change in METS equilibrium with different 𝝂𝒊 
5.3 Sensitivity test for different conduct parameter combinations (𝝂𝟏,𝝂𝟐). 
To show that the above calibration result is robust when relaxing the assumption on conduct 
parameters, a sensitivity test is conducted using wide range of (𝜈1, 𝜈2) combinations. The 
shadow price 𝜙�𝑟 and clearance permit price ℎ� are re-estimated shown in Table 3 and Table 4. It 
is clear that container sector always has higher shadow price than dry-bulk sector (𝜙�1 > 𝜙�2), 
indicating that container sector will always buy emission permits from the dry-bulk sector. The 
resultant clearance permit price ℎ� does not alter too much in this sensitivity test. The 
conclusions of open ETS model calibration also do not alter under our sensitivity test, but to 
save space, the detailed result is eliminated but is available upon request.  
Table 3:  Fuel shadow price for different (𝝂𝟏,𝝂𝟐), 𝜽 = 𝟎.𝟖 
𝜈1 or 𝜈2 𝜙�1 𝜙�2 
-0.8 97.9 92.1 
-0.6 96.5 85.9 
-0.4 95.2 80.5 
-0.2 94.0 75.9 
0.0 92.9 71.8 
0.2 91.8 68.2 
0.4 90.8 64.9 
0.6 89.8 62.0 
0.8 88.9 59.4 
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Table 4:  Clearance permit price 𝒉� for different (𝝂𝟏,𝝂𝟐), 𝜽 = 𝟎.𝟖. 
    𝜈2                   
𝜈1 
-0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
0.8 90.5 87.3 84.4 81.7 79.2 76.9 74.7 72.7 70.9 
0.6 91.0 87.7 84.8 82.0 79.5 77.2 75.0 73.0 71.2 
0.4 91.4 88.2 85.2 82.4 79.9 77.5 75.4 73.3 71.5 
0.2 91.9 88.6 85.6 82.8 80.3 77.9 75.7 73.7 71.8 
0.0 92.5 89.1 86.1 83.3 80.7 78.3 76.1 74.0 72.1 
-0.2 93.0 89.6 86.6 83.7 81.1 78.7 76.4 74.4 72.4 
-0.4 93.6 90.2 87.1 84.2 81.5 79.1 76.8 74.7 72.8 
-0.6 94.2 90.7 87.6 84.7 82.0 79.5 77.3 75.1 73.1 
-0.8 94.8 91.3 88.1 85.2 82.5 80.0 77.7 75.5 73.5 
 
To summarize, dry-bulk sector faces larger proportional change in throughput and profit under 
the ETS. For the open ETS, container sector buy more or sell less emission permits and the dry-
bulk sector is the opposite. For the METS, container sector has higher fuel shadow price and 
would purchase emission permit from dry-bulk sector. The market equilibrium for METS is 
sensitive to change in permit allocation amount 𝜃. Thus the regulator should carefully choose 𝜃 
if METS is decided to be implemented. 
6. Summary and conclusions 
This study theoretically analyzes the impacts of the emission trading scheme (ETS) on the 
shipping industry by considering two different cases: open ETS and maritime only ETS. Since 
there are many different shipping activities, the differential impacts on shipping sectors are 
discussed for both container and dry-bulk sectors.  
The analytical model suggests that whether open or maritime only, ETS will decrease ship’s 
cruising speed, throughput and fuel consumption for both container and bulk sectors. Under the 
open ETS, the emission reduction target is a non-binding constraint since carriers can trade their 
permits with other industries at an exogenous price. Dry-bulk sector will experience larger 
proportional reduction in its throughput and buy less (sell more) permits than container sector 
under open ETS. While under the maritime only ETS (METS), the emission reduction limit will 
definitely be reached, but the permit price is endogenously determined by the trading behavior 
and market structure of both container and dry-bulk sectors. It is theoretically predicted that the 
permit price will be higher when regulator assigns fewer free emission quotas. When the buying 
sector (selling sector) is less competitive (more collusive), the permit price will rise.   
In order to draw solid practical implication, our analytical economic model is also calibrated 
using container and dry-bulk shipping operational data in year 2007. Several empirical results 
are obtained confirming and supplementing our theoretical conclusions. Our simulation shows 
that under Maritime only ETS, container carrier will buy emission permit from the dry-bulk 
side. The endogenous permit price will increase when container (dry-bulk) sector becomes more 
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competitive (collusive). A sensitivity test confirms the robustness of our calibration results 
under different the market structures assumptions of container and dry-bulk sectors. 
As the economic analysis on market-based measures (MBM) to reduce shipping CO2 emission 
has been quite scanty, our research thus provides timely insights for both regulators and industry 
practitioners to evaluate the effects to introduce ETS in shipping sectors.  However, our study is 
also subject to several limitations leading to possible future research. First, shipping network 
can change when ETS is implemented regionally. Shipping firms might re-configure routes to 
avoid the emission charge. Second, shipping demand can be uncertain due to external economic 
situation. Thus the stochastic demand can be a more realistic assumption. We see these analyses 
as natural extensions of our study, although beyond the scope of the present paper.   
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Appendix 1:  Shipping carrier’s market conduct with different 
conduct parameter values. 
The FOC for the profit maximization as equation (3.1) reveals that 
 
 ∂𝜋𝑟,𝑖
∂𝑞𝑟,𝑖 = 𝑃𝑟 + 𝑃𝑟′(𝑄𝑟)𝑞𝑟,𝑖�1 + 𝜈𝑟𝑖,𝑗� − 𝑐𝑟,𝑖 = 0    
 
𝑐𝑟,𝑖 = 1𝑈𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖 𝜌/𝐷𝑟 �𝜂𝜆𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖3 + 𝛾𝑟�, which is the marginal cost for shipping company, and 𝑄𝑟 =
∑ 𝑞𝑟,𝑗𝑁𝑟𝑗=1 , 𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑟. 
 
It is clear that when 𝜈𝑟𝑖,𝑗 = 0, it is just the FOC for Cournot Competition. When 𝜈𝑟𝑖,𝑗 = −1, we 
have  𝑃𝑟 = 𝑐𝑟,𝑖, meaning that the shipping company compete in Bertrand type. When  𝜈𝑟𝑖,𝑗 =
𝑁𝑟 − 1, the FOC becomes 𝑃𝑟 + 𝑃𝑟′𝑄𝑟 − 𝑐𝑟,𝑖 = 0, which is just the FOC for joint profit 
maximization (Perfect collusion) case. Since the competition type among the carriers must be 
between Bertrand and Perfect collusion, the value of 𝜈𝑟𝑖,𝑗 should be between −1 and 𝑁𝑟 − 1. ■ 
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Appendix 2:  Second-order derivative condition for 
maximization problem (3) and (8) 
SOC for the optimization problem in equation (3) 
 
�
�
𝜕2𝜋𝑟,𝑖
𝜕𝑞𝑟,𝑖2 𝜕
2𝜋𝑟,𝑖
𝜕𝑞𝑟,𝑖𝜕𝑆𝑟,𝑖
𝜕2𝜋𝑟,𝑖
𝜕𝑆𝑟,𝑖𝜕𝑞𝑟,𝑖 𝜕2𝜋𝑟,𝑖𝜕𝑆𝑟,𝑖2 �
� = �� −𝑏𝑟(2 + 𝑣𝑟) − 𝐷𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌 (2𝜂𝜆𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖 − 𝛾𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖2 )
−
𝐷𝑟
𝑈𝑟𝜌
(2𝜂𝜆𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖 − 𝛾𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖2 ) −2𝑞𝑟,𝑖𝐷𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌 (𝜂𝜆𝑟 + 𝛾𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖3 ) �� 
 
Off diagonal is equal to zero by the first order condition (6.1). Therefore, for the SOC to hold, 
the product of the diagonal elements should be positive. −2𝑞𝑟,𝑖𝐷𝑟
𝑈𝑟𝜌
�𝜂𝜆𝑟 + 𝛾𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖3 � < 0, and  
−𝑏𝑟(2 + 𝑣𝑟) is also negative because 𝑣𝑟 ≥ −1. So the SOC is satisfied.  
 
SOC for maximization problem (8) 
 
�
�
𝜕2𝜋𝑟,𝑖
𝜕𝑞𝑟,𝑖2 𝜕
2𝜋𝑟,𝑖
𝜕𝑞1,𝑖𝜕𝑆𝑟,𝑖
𝜕2𝜋𝑟,𝑖
𝜕𝑆𝑟,𝑖𝜕𝑞𝑟,𝑖 𝜕2𝜋𝑟,𝑖𝜕𝑆𝑟,𝑖2 �
� = �� −𝑏𝑟(2 + 𝑣𝑟) − 𝐷𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌 [2(𝜂 + 𝜒)𝜆𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖 − 𝛾𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖2 ]
−
𝐷𝑟
𝑈𝑟𝜌
[2(𝜂 + 𝜒)𝜆𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖 − 𝛾𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖2 ] −2𝑞𝑟,𝑖𝐷𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌 [(𝜂 + 𝜒)𝜆𝑟 + 𝛾𝑟𝑆𝑟,𝑖3 ) �� 
 
Similar to the proof of SOC for (3), it can be proved that the SOC for (8) is also satisfied. ■ 
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Appendix 3:  Proof of results in (7) 
As 𝑞�𝑟 =  2𝑎𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌−3𝐷𝑟 �2𝜂𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟232𝑈𝑟𝜌𝑏𝑟[(𝑁𝑟+1)+𝜈𝑟] , it is evident that ∂𝑞�𝑟∂𝜂 < 0, ∂𝑞�𝑟∂𝜆𝑟 < 0, ∂𝑞�𝑟∂𝐷𝑟 < 0, ∂𝑞�𝑟∂𝜈𝑟 < 0. 
 
∂𝑞�𝑟
∂𝑈𝑟
= 3𝐷𝑟 �2𝜂𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟23
2𝑈𝑟
2𝜌𝑏𝑟[(𝑁𝑟+1)+𝜈𝑟] > 0  
 
As ?̃?𝑟 = � 𝛾𝑟2𝜂𝜆𝑟3 > 0, it is evident that ∂?̃?𝑟∂𝜂 < 0,  ∂?̃?𝑟∂𝜆𝑟 < 0, ∂?̃?𝑟∂𝛾𝑟 > 0 
𝐹�𝑟 = �2𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟23 𝐷𝑟(2𝑎𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌−3𝐷𝑟 �2𝜂𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟23 )4 �𝜂23 𝑈𝑟2𝜌2𝑏𝑟[(𝑁𝑟+1)+𝜈𝑟]  , thus, it is clear that  ∂𝐹�𝑟∂𝜈𝑟 < 0 
 
 
As we have 2𝑎𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌 > 3𝐷𝑟�2𝜂𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟23  from (6), thus 
∂𝐹�𝑟
∂𝜂
= − �2𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟23 𝐷𝑟(4𝑎𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌−3𝐷𝑟 �2𝜂𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟23 )
12𝜂 �𝜂23 𝑈𝑟
2𝜌2𝑏𝑟[(𝑁𝑟+1)+𝜈𝑟] < 0  
∂𝐹�𝑟
∂𝜆𝑟
= �2𝛾𝑟23 𝐷𝑟(𝑎𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌−3𝐷𝑟 �2𝜂𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟23 )
6 �𝜆𝑟𝜂2
3 𝑈𝑟
2𝜌2𝑏𝑟[(𝑁𝑟+1)+𝜈𝑟] > or < 0 
∂𝐹�𝑟
∂𝑈𝑟
= − �2𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟23 𝐷𝑟(𝑎𝑟𝑈𝑟𝜌−3𝐷𝑟 �2𝜂𝜆𝑟𝛾𝑟23 )
2 �𝜂23 𝑈𝑟
3𝜌2𝑏𝑟[(𝑁𝑟+1)+𝜈𝑟] > or < 0  ■ 
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Appendix 4:  Data for ship’s speed and size 
Table 5:  Operation statistics for dry-bulk and container shipping sectors in year 2007 
Type 
Size 
(ton for bulk; 
TUE for container) 
Average carriage capacity (ton) Average capacity utilization Total work (million ton-nm) 
Ship size 
(ton) Average speed (knots) 
Bulk 200,000+      227,000  50%    1,297,224       113,500  14.4 
  100,000-199,999      163,000  50%    5,325,597        81,500  14.4 
  60,000-99,999       74,000  55%    5,781,720        40,700  14.4 
  35,000-59,999       45,000  55%    4,181,092        24,750  14.4 
  10,000-34,999       26,000  55%    2,651,294        14,300  14.3 
  0-9,999        2,400  60%       76,414         1,440  11 
Container 8,000+       68,600  70%      822,258        48,020  25.1 
  5000-7999       40,355  70%    1,765,365        28,249  25.3 
  3000-4999       28,784  70%    2,005,250        20,149  23.3 
  2000-2999       16,800  70%      987,297        11,760  20.9 
  1000-1999        7,000  70%      644,848         4,900  19 
  0-999        3,500  70%      199,588         2,450  17 
    Source: Buhaug et al. (2009) 
Ship size for each sub-category of container /dry-bulk sector equals ship’s average carriage capacity times ship’s capacity utilization ratio. To calculate the 
average container / dry-bulk ship size, we use the total work share as weight. The ship’s speed is calculated in the same manner.  
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Appendix 5:  Freight rate and average route distance for container shipping industry 
Table 6:  Cargo flow and route distance for major container transport routes in year 2007 
Route  Transpacific Europe-Asia Transatlantic 
  Asia-USA USA-Asia Asia-Europe Europe-Asia USA-Europe 
Europe-
USA 
Directional Route Cargo Flow (million 
TEU) 15.4 4.9 17.7 10 2.7 4.5 
Aggregate Route Cargo Flow (million 
TEU) 20.3 27.7 7.2 
Percent % in three routes total flow 36.8% 50.2% 13.0% 
Route Distance (nm) 5,780 12,355 5,450 
Average Route Distance (nm) 9,036 
    
                     Source: Review of Maritime Transport 2008, UNCTAD; APL container liner website. 
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Table 7:  Container shipping service freight rate for major routes in year 2007 (USD per TUE) 
Route  Transpacific Europe-Asia Transatlantic 
  Asia-USA USA-Asia Asia-Europe Europe-Asia USA-Europe Europe-USA 
First quarter  1643 737 1549 755 1032 1692 
Second quarter 1675 765 1658 744 1067 1653 
Third quarter 1707 780 1952 777 1115 1725 
Fourth quarter 1707 794 2054 905 1147 1766 
Yearly average 1683 769 1803 795 1090 1709 
Source: Review of Maritime Transport 2008, UNCTAD 
 
Dividing container freight rate by the average route distance for each route, we can obtain route 
specific average yield (USD per TEU-nm). Then aggregating each route’s yield using route cargo 
flow percent as weight, we can get the average yield for container sector, which is 0.0267 USD per 
ton-nm. Then multiplying this average yield by the average route distance 9,036 nms, we get the 
average freight rate for container sector as 240 USD per ton.  
